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ABSTRACT
BENJAMIN T. DANFORTH: The Emergence of Three Worlds of Welfare
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens.)
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s “three worlds” typology of welfare state regimes has become
the dominant heuristic for classifying and examining contemporary welfare states. De-
spite its widespread adoption, however, few systematic efforts have been made to de-
termine when these three worlds first emerged or for what range of history the tripar-
tite typology is applicable. After extending and refining Esping-Andersen’s conceptual
framework for distinguishing welfare state regimes, this study examines cross-sectional
data for each five-year interval from 1950 through 1995 for evidence of tripartite cluster-
ing. Using two forms of cluster analysis—a model-based approach and an agglomerative
hierarchical approach—on each of these cross-sections, this study finds that the three
worlds of welfare first began emerging by 1975, became more distinct by 1980, and were
stable by 1985. These findings are consistent with prominent explanations of welfare
state development that emphasize the role of cumulative partisan political incumbency
and path dependence.
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Introduction
Beginning with Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s seminal typology of welfare capitalism, sig-
nificant scholarly attention has been devoted to classifying contemporary welfare states
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Although he was not the first to develop a framework for
comparing welfare states (e.g., see Titmuss 1958), Esping-Andersen was the first to
systematically show that welfare states can be grouped by distinct, real-world mod-
els. Specifically, in his typology, Esping-Andersen identifies three types of welfare state
regimes by which advanced capitalist democracies can be categorized: liberal, conserva-
tive, and social democratic.
This tripartite typology has served as the conventional lens for welfare state com-
parison, but it has also been the target of a number of major refinements. Three such
refinements include the addition of dimensions for the public provision of social services,
gender egalitarian, or defamilializing, policies, and the mobilization, or activation, of
labor. Even with the incorporation of these three refinements, Esping-Andersen’s ty-
pology has been shown to be fairly robust in distinguishing between the three welfare
state regimes (Edwards 2003). A fourth refinement, which comes from the literature on
varieties of capitalism, further augments the tripartite typology by positing two types
of production regimes: liberal market economy and coordinated market economy, with
“continental” and “Nordic variants” of the latter type (Hall and Soskice 2001; Pontus-
son 2005). Despite initially being presented as somewhat of an alternative to Esping-
Andersen’s state-centered system of classification, the production regime typology has
actually been shown to be highly complementary to the welfare state typology (Ebbing-
haus and Manow 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Stephens 2008). In fact,
the combination of the two typologies into a single framework provides a more accurate
conceptualization of Esping-Andersen’s worlds of welfare capitalism.
Given the intense efforts to refine and expand the tripartite typology of welfare cap-
italism, surprisingly little energy has been dedicated to defining the range of history for
which the typology can be used. Esping-Andersen initially identified three worlds of wel-
fare capitalism using cross-sectional data from 1980, but did these distinct worlds exist
prior to this time point? In other words, when exactly did advanced capitalist democra-
cies crystallize into three distinct worlds of welfare capitalism? Power resources theory,
which has become the dominant approach to the study of welfare state development,
has focused on the causes rather than the timing of consolidation. A partial yet promi-
nent exception is Alexander Hicks’ comparative historical analysis of key social-security
programs in 15–18 advanced industrialized countries from 1880 to 1990 (Hicks 1999).
In his analysis, Hicks finds that many of the countries classified by Esping-Andersen as
social democratic welfare states in 1980 had consolidated social-security programs by
1952 while many of those classified as conservative and liberal did not. Interestingly,
Hicks notes that the three earliest consolidators were all liberal welfare states in 1980:
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Beyond 1952, however, Hicks’ analy-
sis provides little insight on the coalescence of advanced welfare states into three discrete
groups of welfare capitalism.
In this paper, I seek to establish the point in history when three distinct welfare
state regimes first emerged, thus bridging Hicks’ and Esping-Andersen’s analyses. To
determine this point in history, I use two methods of cluster analysis—model-based clus-
ter analysis and agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis—to systematically analyze
welfare state features for 18 OECD countries from 1950 to 1995. The core dimensions
that I will focus on include: decommodification; the public provision of social services;
stratification, which is reconceptualized as population coverage, income redistribution,
and post-tax/transfer poverty; defamilialization; and activation. Due to theoretical con-
siderations and data limitations, these core dimensions are not analyzed equally for the
45-year period under consideration. For similar reasons, I will not include a dimension
for production regimes in my analysis at all. Given this purposeful omission, my analysis
will not directly account for the emergence of three worlds of welfare capitalism per se
but rather three worlds of welfare state regimes.1
Besides ascertaining the point in history when three welfare states regimes first
emerged, this paper also aims to connect the historical development of welfare state
1 Some, like Esping-Andersen (1990), have conflated the concepts of welfare capitalism and welfare
state regimes, but I prefer to keep them more distinct. I consider a welfare state regime to be a
component of a particular type of welfare capitalism. It is the combination of a welfare state regime
with its corresponding production regime that produces a distinct world of welfare capitalism (i.e. welfare
state regime + production regime = world of welfare capitalism).
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clusters with prominent explanations of welfare state consolidation. One such explana-
tion emphasizes the role of political accumulation in spurring the emergence of distinct
welfare state regimes. Drawing on power resources theory, political accumulation has
been conceptualized as the long-term partisan composition of government (Huber, Ra-
gin, and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001). Given that there has been significant
variation in long-term partisan trends across the countries being analyzed, this expla-
nation implies that welfare states should become more distinctive over time. Another
notable explanation, which partly interacts with the first, holds that “increasing return,”
or self-reinforcing, processes of welfare state development should lead to the emergence
of multiple distinct welfare state equilibria (Pierson 2000). This explanation, which is
often referred to as path dependence, not only entails that discrete groupings of welfare
states should emerge but also that these groupings should become relatively stable over
time, both in terms of number and membership. As will be discussed in grater detail, the
empirical evidence presented in this paper provides support for both of these historical
institutional explanations.
Conceptualizing the Welfare State
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds
The welfare state has long been a topic of interest in comparative politics and po-
litical sociology, but it was not until Esping-Andersen’s breakthrough work on the topic
that scholars seriously began to consider and evaluate multiple dimensions and multiple
types of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990). In his work, Esping-Anderson breaks
from the prior literature on the subject by recognizing that the welfare state is not just a
minimal set of social-ameliorating policies and that social expenditure levels offer a poor
basis for welfare state comparison. With these shortcomings in mind, Esping-Andersen
reconceptualizes the welfare state as having two key dimensions: decommodification
and stratification. Decommodification represents the degree to which the social rights
granted by the welfare state enable an individual (or family) to maintain a livelihood
without relying on the market.2 Stratification, on the other hand, refers to the social
2 Esping-Andersen provides two definitions of decommodification, one that emphasizes the individual
(1990, 23) and one that stresses both the individual and the family (1990, 37).
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ordering that is embedded in and reinforced by the welfare state. To measure these
dimensions, Esping-Anderson develops a number of indices that not only tap the expen-
diture levels of social provisions but also the eligibility requirements, coverage, targeting,
and public-private mixtures associated with these provisions. Finally, drawing on this
last point, Esping-Andersen stresses the need to look at the interaction between the
welfare state and the other two main sources of social provisions, namely the family and
the market, to fully ascertain the decommodifying and stratifying features of the welfare
state.
When Esping-Andersen uses the two welfare state dimensions, decommodification
and stratification, in a cross-country analysis of advanced capitalist democracies, he
demonstrates that there is not one universal welfare state model. Instead, Esping-
Andersen identifies three salient types of what he terms as welfare state regimes. Each
of these welfare state regimes represents a discrete logic of welfare state organization,
stratification, and integration in a broad societal context. Esping-Andersen labels the
three regime types as liberal, conservative, and social democratic, which reflect their
distinct historical origins and developmental trajectories.
The liberal welfare state regime relies heavily on the market for the provision of
social benefits and services, with the state providing support only to those who cannot
support themselves in the market. This regime is built on liberal work-ethic norms
and thus its state-provided benefits tend to be modest and restricted, with a strong
emphasis on means-testing and strict eligibility requirements. In order to further limit
state welfare obligations, there is an active encouragement of private welfare schemes.
Given the residual nature of this regime, it is only weakly decommodifying. It also leads
to a dualistic social order, with a minority dependent on state welfare and a majority
reliant on market-differentiated welfare.
The conservative welfare state regime gives primacy to the family in the provision
of care and support, with the state intervening only if the family’s capacity to service
itself is undermined. With strong historical links to absolutism and Catholicism, this
regime grants differentiated social rights based on class and status while adhering to
the principle of subsidiarity with respect to the family.3 Consequently, most social
3 The principle of subsidiarity holds that society should rely on the smallest group possible that can
perform a given social function. In practice, this group is usually the family.
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benefits are delivered through social insurance schemes that are organized according
to narrow, occupation-based solidarities. The regime’s emphasis on upholding class
differences limits its decommodifying impact.
The social democratic welfare state regime seeks to emancipate the individual from
both the family and the market through generous and universal state-sponsored social
rights. Firmly rooted in social democracy, this regime gives high priority to social
equality and economic redistribution and strives to secure its citizens’ welfare for the
entire life course, from the cradle to the grave. To foster universal solidarity in favor of
the welfare state, some social benefits are graduated according to earnings. Although
this regime is highly decommodifying, it is also highly committed to full employment,
mainly out of necessity to financially sustain itself.
These three regime types form the cores of the worlds of welfare capitalism envisioned
by Esping-Andersen. In his empirical analysis, Esping-Andersen shows that these regime
types do seem to correspond with real-world clusters of countries in 1980 (see Tables
1 and 2). As the remaining discussion points out, however, Esping-Andersen’s concep-
tualization and analysis do suffer from a number of key deficiencies that warrant being
addressed.
Incorporating Public Provision of Social Services, Gender, and Activation
Although Esping-Andersen’s tripartite typology of welfare state regimes is widely
considered an insightful breakthrough, it has not been immune to criticism. To the
contrary, Esping-Andersen’s typology has been at the center of a lively and productive
body of scholarship that aims to expand and improve welfare state categorization and
comparison. One thread in this literature has focused on identifying additional regime
types, particularly for welfare states in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe (Leibfried
1993; Ferrera 1996; Gans-Morse and Orenstein 2008).4 Nearly all of the new regime
types established by this body of work are, however, products of the third wave of
democratization of the 1980s and 1990s and thus postdate Esping-Andersen’s three
4 A number of alternative welfare state typologies have also been developed, with a notable one
being the quadripartite typology proposed by Castles and Mitchell (1993). Their typology retains the
conservative and social democratic regime types identified by Esping-Andersen while dividing the liberal
regime type into subgroups. One subgroup, which is labeled as “Antipodean,” is characterized by low
expenditures but high redistribution. The second subgroup, which retains the “liberal” label, features
much lower levels of redistribution and a greater reliance on market-based welfare solutions.
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regime types for 1980. For this reason, these new regime types are not discussed further
or incorporated into this study. A second thread has sought to revise and supplement
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state dimensions, with a particular emphasis on the public
provision of social services, gender, and activation. According to this body of work,
these three dimensions are not secondary elements but core features of the welfare state.
In order to better differentiate the social democratic regime from the other two regime
types, a number of scholars have pushed for the inclusion of public social services into
the multidimensional framework of welfare state regimes. Although Esping-Andersen
expressly aims to take a holistic approach to welfare state comparison, much of his anal-
ysis of welfare state differences is centered around old-age, sickness, and unemployment
cash benefits (i.e. transfer payments). It has been pointed out, however, that a key
distinguishing feature of the social democratic regime type is its emphasis on the public
financing and delivery of social services (Huber and Stephens 2001). As Scharpf and
Schmidt (2000) argue, this feature represents a critical piece of information for accurately
dividing the country groupings for the social democratic and conservative regime types.
This is the case because these two regime types largely differ in how they organize their
“caring” services: the social democratic regime type, as stated before, prefers profession-
alized public solutions while the conservative regime type favors informal, family-based
solutions (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). In effect, the absence of a dimension for the pub-
lic provision of social services in Esping-Andersen’s original typology makes it incapable
of fully secerning social democratic welfare states from conservative ones.
Pointing to the growing literature on gender and the welfare state, many scholars
argue that gender is also an essential dimension for welfare state classification. Despite
alluding to its importance in his initial reconceptualization of the welfare state, Esping-
Andersen does not elevate gender to the same level as decommodification or stratification
in his analysis. Many feminist scholars have criticized this conceptual judgment, noting
that the decommodifying effects of welfare states are often conditioned on gender (Orloff
1996; O’Connor 1996; Sainsbury 1996). This has been shown to be particularly true with
respect to the role of women in the family and their relationship to the market. Welfare
states not only strongly shape the employment opportunities available to women, but
they also largely determine the degree to which women can break their dependence on
the family (Hobson 1990; Orloff 1996). In particular, the types and levels of family
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allowances, parental leave schemes, child and elderly care provisions, active labor mar-
ket policies, and other gender egalitarian policies guaranteed by a welfare state are all
crucial determinants of women’s economic independence. In light of these substantial
linkages, gender has become increasingly incorporated into welfare state classifications
and analyses.
In response to the critiques regarding gender, Esping-Andersen has tweaked his con-
ceptualization of the welfare state to include a new dimension that better captures gen-
der relations (Esping-Andersen 1999). Following the lead of several feminist scholars,
Esping-Andersen tags this dimension as “defamilialization,” which is meant to draw at-
tention to the welfare state’s role in reshaping family patterns and bestowing social rights
to individuals (Sainsbury 1996). From a gender perspective, defamilialization gauges the
degree to which social policies enable women to sustain households independent of the
family. When this new dimension is used to look at cross-country gendered outcomes,
patterns emerge that correspond with Esping-Andersen’s original tripartite typology
(Sainsbury 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Huber et al. 2005). In other words, the
addition of a gender-oriented dimension to Esping-Andersen’s conceptual framework of
the welfare state does not diminish but strengthens the explanatory power of his regime
types.
Another important element of the social democratic regime that is underempha-
sized by Esping-Andersen’s classification system is activation. In his discussion of the
social democratic regime, Esping-Andersen highlights the regime’s highly decommodi-
fying welfare efforts without drawing much attention to its seemingly paradoxical but
crucial efforts to activate labor. By mobilizing labor through active labor market poli-
cies, including training, retraining, and support for relocation, the social democratic
regime is strongly associated with a highly qualified and integrated labor force (Huber
and Stephens 2001). As mentioned before, activation, through these active labor market
policies in combination with gender egalitarian social services described earlier, is also
critical for the integration of women into the labor force. Therefore, given its high com-
mitment to activation and full employment, the social democratic regime also features
high levels of female labor force participation (Hicks and Kenworthy 2003). Given that
activation is so strongly identified with the social democratic regime, it represents an-
other conceptual device by which this regime type can be distinguished from the other
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two, particularly the conservative regime. Although decommodification alone is suffi-
cient to differentiate between the social democratic and liberal regimes, activation as
well as public social services and gender are needed to clearly distinguish between the
social democratic and conservative regimes.
A Complete, Multidimensional Framework
Building on Esping-Andersen’s original typology and the prominent conceptual re-
finements made to it, a more complete and comprehensive typological framework of the
three worlds of welfare can be constructed. In this section, I present such a framework
(see Table 3). The dimensions used to derive this framwork are later used to inform
my selection of measures for analysis. To some degree, these dimensions will also be
employed as benchmarks to determine the timing and sequencing of welfare state crys-
tallization after 1950.
Rather than having two dimensions, as Esping-Andersen’s typology does, the ty-
pological framework for welfare state regimes that I have developed features seven di-
mensions. These seven dimensions include: decommodification, the public provision
of social services, population coverage, income redistribution, post-tax/transfer poverty,
defamilialization, and activation. The decommodification dimension comes from Esping-
Andersen’s original typology while three of the other dimensions—public provision of
social services, defamilialization, and activation—simply reflect typological refinements
discussed earlier. Esping-Andersen’s dimension for stratification has been omitted in
favor of several discrete dimensions: population coverage, income redistribution, and
post-tax/transfer poverty. Population coverage represents the degree to which welfare
state benefits and services are universal and, to some degree, the way in which these
benefits and services are distributed. In welfare states with high levels of population
coverage and social rights linked to citizenship, the role of status and class in structuring
opportunities is expected to be minimal or in decline. If welfare states do not conform to
this ideal type of universalism, however, state-provided welfare can reinforce status and
class cleavages. Income redistribution—a function that has long been associated with
the welfare state—constitutes one way in which welfare states directly impact social
structures and equality (Kenworthy 1999; Moller et al. 2003). The effect of such welfare
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state involvement is, to a large extent, captured by post-tax/transfer poverty. I contend
that these three separate dimensions better capture the impact that each welfare state
regime has on social stratification and inequality than a single, amalgamated dimension.
As mentioned before, I have purposefully omitted production regime as a dimension
in this typological framework. Welfare state regimes and production regimes have been
shown to be mutually enabling in a number of ways, and they do share some common
historical origins, particularly with respect to the strength of union organization. But,
to a good extent, these two groups of regimes have evolved in different ways, at different
speeds, and for different reasons. For instance, cross-national differences in contempo-
rary industrial-relations systems, which are core parts of the production regimes, reflect
cross-national differences in the strength and scope of employer organizations during
the early 20th century (Crouch 1993). In a similar vein, cross-national differences in
contemporary training regimes can be traced back to 19th-century traditions of coop-
eration and coordination (Thelen 2004). As these examples highlight, contemporary
production regimes are largely products of long historical relationships between working
class movements and employers. This contrast with the more recent story of welfare state
development, which is largely driven by a struggle over taxation between social demo-
cratic forces and their conservative counterparts (Swenson 1991; Iversen and Stephens
2008).
From a practical standpoint, the inclusion of production regime as a dimension is
also problematic because it is in itself a complex, multidimensional concept and it does
not readily lend itself to quantitative operationalization. So, while acknowledging that
production regimes are integral components of the three worlds of welfare capitalism,
I do not aspire to trace their historical development into distinct types. Rather, I will
focus my analysis on the historical emergence of three types of welfare state regimes,
which are defined by the seven dimensions listed in Table 3.
The Emergence of Three Worlds
While much scholarly effort has been devoted to the conceptual expansion and revi-
sion of the tripartite typology of welfare state regimes, there have been no systematic
studies of when these distinct regimes first emerged. In other words, there is little
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concrete knowledge as to when the welfare states of advanced capitalist democracies
first crystallized into separate liberal, conservative, and social democratic clusters. In-
stead, most historical analysis of the three welfare state regime types has dealt with the
question of their origins: why have separate regime types emerged? From this analysis,
several theoretical approaches have emerged, with power resources theory being the most
prominent and widely used approach.5 According to this approach, the distribution of
organizational power between labor organizations and left parties on one side and right-
wing political forces on the other side serves as the primary determinant of differences
in welfare state development across countries and over time (Stephens 1979; Huber and
Stephens 2001). This is the approach that Esping-Andersen adopts in his explanation
of why there are different, real-world models of welfare capitalism. But with so much
focus on answering the question of why, the question of when has fallen to the wayside.
The main contribution of this research project will be to address this latter question
by systematically examining the histories of welfare states to determine when they first
constellated into three distinct welfare state regimes.
There have been numerous efforts to replicate and extend Esping-Andersen’s empir-
ical classifications, but these prior studies have not clearly distinguished when welfare
states coalesced into three distinct groupings. Some of these studies simply apply a
corrected version of Esping-Andersen’s ad hoc clustering technique to more recent data
(Bambra 2006; Scruggs and Allan 2006) while others use cluster analysis and other con-
ventional methods to analyze data with more extensive numbers of cases and variables
(Ragin 1994; Edwards 2003; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003; Powell and Barrientos
2004; Schro¨der 2009). Most previous analyses have been temporally limited, focusing
on one or a few cross sections of data from the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. One
exception is an analysis done by Kangas (1994), which compares country clusters for
1985 with clusters for 1950. This study has, however, limited relevance for broad clas-
sification efforts because it focuses exclusively on categorizing sick pay schemes. Two
other exceptions include studies conducted by Obinger and Wagschal (2001) and Castles
and Obinger (2008). Both of these studies include cluster analyses of variables averaged
for the period from 1960 to the mid-1970s, but this time frame is too expansive to draw
meaningful conclusions about the timing of regime crystallization. Moreover, the aim
5 The other two main approaches include the “logic of industrialism” and “state-centric” approaches.
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of these two studies is not to identity clusters of welfare states but rather “families of
nations,” which are conceptually more encompassing than welfare state regimes.
Although no prior studies have been able to pinpoint the time at which welfare states
coalesced into three distinct groupings, the empirical work done by Esping-Andersen
(1990) and Hicks (1999) provides some broad clues (see Table 4). In first identifying the
existence of three worlds of welfare state regimes, Esping-Andersen uses cross-sectional
data from 1980, which implies that the three welfare state regime types had crystallized
by this point. As discussed earlier, however, Esping-Andersen’s seminal analysis uses
a more narrowly defined framework for his clustering, which thus casts some doubt
on his identification of three delineated clusters for 1980.6 At the same time, Esping-
Andersen does not thoroughly discuss or investigate whether the three worlds emerged
prior to 1980, except to say that the three worlds did not exist prior to 1950 (1999,
53).7 Moving further back in history, Hicks identifies two clusters of welfare states for
1952 based on whether each welfare state had implemented five major types of income
maintenance programs: pensions; sickness, disability, and unemployment insurances;
and family allowances. Again, despite using a very narrow conceptualization of welfare
state regimes, Hicks’ clusters of consolidators and non-consolidators indicate that the
three worlds did not emerge until after the 1950s. Together, these two sets of findings
suggest that the three welfare state regimes crystallized after 1950 and perhaps by 1980.
Data
In order to locate historically when the three worlds of welfare first emerged, I an-
alyze the welfare states of 18 advanced capitalist countries using the multidimensional
framework described in Table 3 for each five-year interval from 1950 to 1995 inclusive.8
The measures for this framework are primarily drawn from the Social Citizenship Indi-
cator Program (SCIP), which is the main data set utilized by Esping-Andersen in Three
6 A common critique of Esping-Andersen’s work is that his own analysis does not produce clear-cut
clusters. For example, looking at the Esping-Andersen’s reproduced results in Table 1, the cut points
between the three clusters of welfare states appear somewhat arbitrary.
7 It is not even clear why Esping-Andersen chooses to look at 1980 because he offers little discussion
on his selection of data.
8 The 18 countries included in this analysis are those originally analyzed by Esping-Andersen: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.9 29 measures are used to tap the seven welfare state
dimensions, though data for all of these measures are not available for the entire 45-year
range of history under study. Beginning in 1950, data are limited to 19 measures for
three dimensions, but with each subsequent decade, additional measures become avail-
able and are thus utilized. By 1980, data are available for all of the chosen measures for
all seven dimensions.10 In essence, four different sets of measures—each more extensive
than the one preceding it—are derived from the data for the purpose of analysis. These
four sets are labeled A, B, C, and D. See Table 5 for an overview of the measures and
their sources and Table 6 for a breakdown of which measures comprise each set.
The decommodification dimension is operationalized as 12 measures, all of which
come from the SCIP data set and are available for the entire period from 1950–1995.
Three of these measures are the standard net replacement rates for an individual average
production worker (APW) for three basic social-insurance programs: old-age pensions,
sick pay, and unemployment insurance. The minimum old-age pension, represented as
the net replacement rate for an individual APW, is also included. Together, these re-
placement rates summarize the degree to which the cash benefits approximate a worker’s
expected market-based income. In order to capture benefit conditionality, the number
of years (or weeks) of contributions to qualify for the entitlements are used in addition
to the share of the benefit financed by worker contributions for old-age pensions and
the number of waiting days to receive sick pay and unemployment insurance. Lastly,
the number of weeks of benefit duration for sickness and unemployment are included to
represent the maximum duration of these entitlements. All of these measures are equiv-
alent to those used by Esping-Andersen to construct his unweighted decommodification
indices in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).11
9 The Social Citizenship Indicator Program was formerly known as the Svensk Socialpolitik i Interna-
tional Belysning (SSIB). The other five data sets used in this paper include: the Comparative Welfare
States Data Set; the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), the Luxembourg In-
come Study (LIS); the Comparative Maternity, Paternal, and Childcare Database; and the OECD’s
Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).
10 The historical discrepancy in data availability for the seven dimensions is largely due to the limited
scope of past data-collection efforts, but it may also be indicative of trends in welfare state development.
In other words, data may have not been collected on defamilialization and activation in the initial
decades of the post-war era because these dimensions of the welfare state had not yet developed or been
articulated.
11 Following Esping-Andersen’s approach, I also constructed decommodification indices for each inter-
val from 1950 through 1995. The indices have been analyzed in lieu of these 12 separate members in the
model-based approach to cluster analysis, and the results are essentially the same. For this reason, the
results are not reported in this paper.
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One measure, the total civilian government employment as a percentage of the
working-age population, is used to quantify the public provision of social services. This
measure serves as a proxy for the amount of state involvement in the delivery of social
services, like health care, education, and personal care. Of course, this measure also
includes civilian government employees in non-welfare sectors, but it has been pointed
out that nearly all variations in civilian public employment across countries and time
can be accounted for by welfare state employment (Huber and Stephens, 2001a: 51).
This measure is available from 1960 onward.
Two sets of indicators are used to measure population coverage, the first of which
captures social-insurance coverage while the second summarizes social-service coverage.
The first set of indicators is comprised of the coverage rates for the old-age pensions, sick
pay, and unemployment insurance. These coverage rates are calculated as the percentage
of the labor force, ages 16–64, that is entitled to receive the benefits upon fulfilling basic
eligibility conditions. The take-up rate for pensions—the percentage of the pension-
age population that receives pensions—is also incorporated into this set of indicators.
These same measures are used by Esping-Andersen to weight his decommodifiication
indices and compute a summary measure of “average universalism” (Esping-Andersen
1990, 54, 78). The second set of indicators has only one member: the public share
of total expenditures on health care as a percentage of GDP. This measure provides a
good approximation of population coverage because public spending on health care is
generally a function of the universalism of publicly provided health care. The first set
of measures is available for the entire period of history being analyzed while the last
measure is only available from 1960 on.
As measures of income redistribution, I use Esping-Andersen’s summary measure
of benefit equality for each social-insurance program as well as Gini indices for gross
and net income inequality. The benefit equality measures are calculated as the ratio
between the standard and maximum replacement rates for an individual APW for old-
age pensions, sick pay, and unemployment insurance (Esping-Andersen 1990, 78).12 The
12 The benefit equality measure for old-age pensions is computed using net (after-tax) figures while
the corresponding measures for sick pay and unemployment insurance are calculated using gross figures.
Although it would be preferable to derive all three of these measures from net replacement rates, data
for net maximum replacement rates are not available for sick pay and unemployment insurance in the
SCIP data set. The use of gross rates as a substitute is, however, not likely to pose a major problem
because the corresponding net and gross replacement rates that are available are all highly correlated
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Gini indices for gross and net income inequality consist of data from the World Income
Inequality Database (WIID) that have been systematically standardized using the higher
quality but more limited data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (Solt 2009). In
conjunction with benefit equality measures, these two indices summarize the ability of
welfare states to reduce income inequality, particularly through transfer payments. Data
for the first three measures are available from 1950 onward and the later two measures
for 1960 and afterward.
The measures for post-tax/transfer poverty are three relative poverty rates computed
from the LIS, with the poverty threshold set at 50% of the net (i.e. post-tax/transfer)
equivalized median disposable income. The first relative poverty rate covers the total
population while the second and third focus on two vulnerable sub-populations, namely
children (those under 18 years old) and the elderly (those over 64 years old). Although
these three rates do not capture the absolute extent to which poverty is reduced, they do
reflect the capacity of welfare states to maintain low poverty rates. Due to the limited
historical scope of the LIS data set, these measures are only available for 1980 and
beyond.13
The final two dimensions, defamilialization and activation, are measured using three
variables: female labor force participation, parental leave generosity, and active labor
market policies (ALMP). Female labor force participation—the percentage of women
aged 15–64 who are employed or seeking work—is partly a function of welfare poli-
cies that help women achieve work–family balance. Although it does not directly or
fully gauge the defamilializing efforts of welfare states, this measure is included for its
relatively extensive temporal range, starting in 1960. A better measure of defamilializa-
tion, parental leave generosity, is also used to assess defamilialization, though it is only
available from 1970 onward. This measure is the average replacement rate for parental
leave for a 52-week period. For cases in which the leave period is longer than 52-weeks
(Sweden in 1990 and 1995), the data are adjusted to fit this annual scale. Finally, the
last variable is the total spending on ALMP as a percentage of GDP, with this quotient
(0.95 and above).
13 Some data points for the relative poverty measure as well as the Gini indices have been filled in
using neighboring data points (e.g. for Canada, the 1981 data point for relative poverty is used as the
value for 1980). This approach is justified because relative poverty rates and Gini indices for individual
countries vary little over short periods of time.
14
weighted by the proportion of the population that is unemployed. This measure rates
the activation efforts of welfare states and is only available for 1980 and afterward.
Many of the measures described above have, in part, been chosen for their historical
completeness, but there are still a few instances of missing data. The proportion of miss-
ingness ranges from 0.29% to 5.94% of the total data across the 10 cross-sections under
analysis. In order to preserve the existing data and permit effective cluster analysis,
the missing data points are estimated using nearest neighbor averaging (Troyanskaya
et al. 2001).14 This method is superior to other single imputation approaches because it
does not assume that all observations are members of a single group or drawn from one
probability distribution. In other words, it is well suited to handle missingness in data
that are suspected to be clustered. Like all single imputation methods, however, near-
est neighbor averaging does not accurately reflect the uncertainty surrounding imputed
values. Unfortunately, an imputation method for cluster analysis that is as robust as
multiple imputation for linear models has not yet been fully developed.
Methods
In order to discern when three distinct types of welfare state regimes first crystal-
lized, I implement two methods of cluster analysis: model-based cluster analysis and
agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis.15 Generally speaking, cluster analysis is a
multivariate statistical technique that partitions data into subsets (i.e. clusters) of sim-
ilar objects. Ideally, these clusters exhibit high internal homogeneity (members within
clusters are very similar) as well as high external heterogeneity (members in each cluster
are very dissimilar to those in other clusters). Model-based cluster analysis, which is
rooted in probability theory, represents a more rigorous approach to identifying clusters,
but it only performs well when clusters are relatively distinct. Agglomerative hierarchi-
cal cluster analysis, which is based on distance, is capable of recognizing more tentative
clusters, but it does not produce as reliable results. Used together, these two approaches
can detect both strong and weak welfare state clusterings for each of the five-year in-
14 This process, which is implemented in the impute package for R, proceeds by finding the k nearest
neighbors of an observation with missing values using the Euclidean metric. The missing values are then
imputed by averaging the relevant elements of the nearest neighbors. For this paper, k is set at 4.
15 The cluster analyses in this paper have been conducted using the mclust and pvclust packages for R
version 2.8.1.
15
tervals examined in this paper from 1950 through 1995. For the sake of comparability,
analysis is done on each of the four sets of measures (A, B, C, D) for the all of intervals
that they are available.
Model-Based Cluster Analysis
Mixture Model Estimation with Bayesian Regularization
The core assumption of model-based cluster analysis is that data are generated by a
finite mixture of probability distributions, which each component representing a different
group or cluster. Given a set of observations x = (x1, ..., xn), the density function can
be expressed as
f(x) =
n∏
i=1
G∑
k=1
τkfk(xi|θk), (1)
where fk(·|θk) is a probability distribution with parameters θk, τk is the probability that
an observation belongs to the kth component, and G is the total number of compo-
nents. As is conventionally done, I assume that each fk(·|θk) is a multivariate normal
(Gaussian) density function, with θk consisting of two parameters: mean vector µk and
covariance matrix Σk.16 Under this specification, the components of the mixture model
are ellipsoidal in shape and centered at their means, µk.
Banfield and Raftery (1993) have extended this model-based framework for cluster-
ing by reparametrizing the covariance matrix in a form that permits variation in the
orientation, shape, and volume of the components or clusters. This new form expresses
the covariance matrix of the kth component as
Σk = λkDkAkDTk , (2)
where Dk is the orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors, Ak is a diagonal matrix proportional
to the eigenvalues, and λk is a scalar. Using this formulation, the geometric features
of the components can be allowed to vary. For each component k, Dk determines the
16 The density for the multivariate normal has the following form
φ(xi|µk,Σk) ≡ exp
ˆ− 1
2
(xi − µk)TΣ−1k (xi − µk)
˜
(2pi)
n
2 (Σk)
1
2
.
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orientation, Ak determines the shape, and λk determines the volume. By selectively re-
stricting these parameters to be constant across all components, it is possible to derive a
number of different covariance parameterizations with unique combinations of geometric
features. Table 7, which is reproduced from Fraley and Raftery (2007b), lists possible
covariance parameterizations and their geometric features.
A common approach to estimating the mixture models used in model-based clustering
is to use the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, a two-step iterative estimation
process (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin 1977). The first step, the E-step, uses estimates
of the component means µk, covariance matrices Σj , and mixture proportions τj to
compute the conditional probability that observation i belongs to the jth component.
zik =
τkφ(xi|µk,Σk)∑G
j=1 τjφ(xi|µj ,Σj)
, (3)
where φ(·) is the multivariate normal distribution.17 Using this conditional probability,
the M-step estimates a new set of parameters from the data. This two-step process is
repeated as many times as needed until the difference in the parameter updates becomes
arbitrarily small and convergence is thus reached. At this point, each observation is
assigned to the component for which it has the highest posterior probability of being a
member.
Despite its relative simplicity, it is not uncommon for the EM algorithm to fail to
converge for mixture models, generally because of singularity in the covariance matrix.
If singularity exists, the EM algorithm can be expected to diverge to a point of infinite
likelihood.18 More specifically, the likelihood approaches infinity if the global optimum
places a component on a single data point and sets the covariance for that component
to 0.19 Issues of singularity are most likely to appear in models with a large number
of components and models in which the covariance matrix is allowed to vary between
components.
In order to avoid degeneracy in the estimation of mixture models, Fraley and Raftery
17 In effect, the classification of observation i is treated as missing data.
18 This is based on the assumption that the likelihood is not bounded, as is generally the case for
mixture models.
19 As Fraley and Raftery (2007a) point out, an infinite likelihood could be treated as a valid maximum
likelihood estimate, but it does not possess the usual good properties of MLEs
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(2007a) propose using the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate from a Bayesian anal-
ysis. By treating the Gaussian form of Equation 1 as a likelihood function and assigning
a prior distribution to it, the problem of estimation failure due to singularity is elim-
inated. Based on this approach, which is often referred to as Bayesian regularization,
the posterior predictive density is assumed to be of form
pi(τk, µk,Σk|x) ∝ L(x|τk, µk,Σk)p(τk, µk,Σk|θ), (4)
where L(x|τk, µk,Σk) is the mixture likelihood function
L(x|τk, µk,Σk) =
n∏
i=1
G∑
k=1
τkφ(xi|µk,Σk), , (5)
and p(τk, µk,Σk|θ) is the prior distribution on the parameters τk, µk, and Σk, with
θ representing other parameters. Adhering to recommendations made by Fraley and
Raftery (2007a), I use a conjugate prior, with a normal prior on the mean that is
conditional on variance
µ|Σ ∼ N (µp,Σ/κp), (6)
and an inverse Wishart prior on the covariance matrix
Σ ∼ inverseWishart(νp,Λp), (7)
where µp, κp, νp, and Λp are the mean, shrinkage, degrees of freedom, and scale, respec-
tively.20 For the analyses in this paper, these four hyperparameters are assigned the
following values: µp = the mean of the data; κp = 0.4; νp = the dimension of the data
(d) + 2; and Λp = 10 or 20.21 These values make the prior very diffuse, thus ensuring
20 See Fraley and Raftery (2005; 2007a) for the analytical solutions for the mean and variance at the
MAP. They have derived solutions in the multivariate case for both inverse gamma and inverse Wishart
conjugate priors.
21 Two of these hyperparameters, µp and νp, have values that are recommended by Fraley and Raftery
(2007a; 2007b). The value for κp, which represents the addition of a fraction of an observation to each
component, was determined through experimentation. The values for Λp are significantly larger than
those recommended by Fraley and Raftery, leading to a more diffuse distribution. Λp is set to 10 for the
cross-sections before 1980 and to 20 for the cross-sections for and after 1980: the increase is needed to
compensate for the addition of many measures in 1980.
Generally, Λp is a matrix, but when the covariance matrix is constrained to be spherical (the ma-
trix is proportional to the identity matrix) or diagonal (the matrix has non-negative elements only on
the diagonal), the inverse-Wishart distribution reduces to the inverse-gamma distribution. The scalar
parameter for the inverse-gamma distribution is defined as a positive real number.
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that any inferences made from the posterior density will mostly be driven by the data.
Once the posterior density described in Equation 4 is fully specified, the EM algo-
rithm can used to estimate the posterior mode or MAP (maximum a posterior), which
replaces the conventional maximum likelihood estimate.
Model Selection Using the Bayesian Information Criterion
Following a model-selection strategy developed by Fraley and Raftery (1998), mixture-
model estimation can be used to detect the number of clusters and their features in set of
data. First, a maximum number of clusters or components, Gmax, and a set covariance
parameterizations for Gaussian mixture models are chosen for consideration. Second,
parameters are estimated using EM for each possible combination of the covariance pa-
rameterizations and the number of components up to Gmax.22 Third, a slightly modified
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is computed for each model estimated in the prior
step.23 Finally, the optimal number of components and covariance parameterization is
determined by selecting the model for which the BIC is negatively maximized.
For the purposes of this study, the maximum number of components is limited to
eight components and the set of covariance parameterizations is constrained to spherical
and diagonal types. These values are chosen to reduce the chance of estimation failure
due to singularity, which is a concern given that the number of dimensions in the data
(ranging from 19 in 1950 to 29 in 1980 and beyond) exceeds the number of observations
(18 countries). To further help ensure convergence and be consistent in terms of data
preprocessing, all measures are standardized to have zero means and unit standard
deviations.
22 Following Fraley and Raftery’s (2007a) suggestion, the conditional probabilities generated by model-
based hierarchical clustering are used as the initial values for the EM process.
23 Typically, the BIC has the form
BIC ≡ 2loglikM(x, θ∗k)− (# params)M log(n),
where loglikM is the maximized log-likelihood for model M and the given data, (# params)M is the
number of parameters to be estimated in the model, and n is the number of observations in the data.
For Bayesian regularized models, the BIC is modified by replacing the maximized log-likelihood term
with the log-likelihood evaluated at posterior mode or MAP (Fraley and Raftery 2007a).
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Agglomerative Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
As a complement to the model-based approach to clustering, I employ the more
conventional technique of agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis. In this approach
to classification, data are not partitioned into a particular number of clusters in a single
step, but rather they are assigned to clusters through a successive process. This method
is termed “agglomerative” if the analysis starts with one-member or singleton clusters
that are in turn merged into increasingly larger clusters. The end result of this process
is a hierarchy of clusters, which is often presented graphically as a dendrogram.24
Of the many agglomerative procedures that are available, I use Ward’s method in
my analyses. In this method, the fusion of two clusters is based on their combined
error sum of squares (ESS), with the objective being to minimize this criterion in each
successive step.25 As the measure of distance between clusters, I choose the Euclidean
metric. Under these specifications, identified clusters tend to be spherical in shape and
have equal volumes. Together, Ward’s method and the Euclidean metric represent the
most frequently used agglomerative clustering technique.
In order to eliminate the effect of different measurement scales on clustering decisions,
I standardize all measures before analysis. A well-known issue with hierarchical cluster
analysis is the sensitivity of its results to different scales of measurement—measures with
larger scales are more decisive in determining clusters than those with smaller scales. A
common solution to this problem, which I adopt for my analyses, is to standardize all
measures to unit variance.
Although interpreting the dendrograms produced by hierarchical clustering methods
is often seen as a subjective process, it is possible to generate measures of uncertainty
for these graphical results. Specifically, bootstrap resampling techniques can be used
to estimate the probability that each cluster is supported by the data. A conventional
bootstrapping approach can be used to compute the bootstrap probability (BP), which
represents the frequency with which a cluster appears in the bootstrap replicates. This
technique is considered inferior to a more advanced based multi-scale bootstrap re-
24 The “leaves” of this tree-like graphic are singleton clusters, the nodes constitute successive multi-
member clusters, and the “branches” represent the distance between successive clusters.
25 Fraley and Raftery (1998) have pointed out Ward’s method is equivalent to the most restricted
covariance parameterization listed in Table 7, Σk = λI.
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sampling, which produces approximately unbiased (AU) probability values (Suzuki and
Shimodaira 2006). Both of these p-values are calculated and reported for each edge of
each dendrogram.
Results
Table 8 presents the optimal number of distinct clusters detected by model-based
cluster analysis for each five-year interval from 1950–1995 for each set of measures.
More detailed results, including country classifications and classification uncertainties,
are reported in Tables 9–12 by measure set. To better show how the 18 countries are
clustered in each iteration of the analysis, the countries classifications by measure set
and interval are reproduced in Tables 13–16. Figures 1–14 contain the dendrograms
generated by agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis, again broken down by measure
set and interval.
The summary results reported in Table 8 indicate that the three worlds of welfare
were first emerging by 1975, became more pronounced by 1980, and were relatively
stable by 1985. Two worlds are discernible in 1950 and 1955, but from 1960 up through
1970 there is no evidence to suggest the formation of a third world. In fact, during
the 1960–1970 period, many of the results suggest the presence of only one cluster,
which essentially indicates the absence of any meaningful, discrete country groupings.
By 1985, however, the 18 countries have coalesced into three distinguishable worlds, an
arrangement that remains static up through the last interval, 1995.
Drilling down into the results reveals that the two country groupings identified for
the 1950s are highly unbalanced. As Tables 9 and 13 show, Australia and New Zealand
form one cluster and the remaining 16 countries are grouped into the other. By 1960,
however, the optimal number of clusters for measure set A is four, with the Nordic
countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States forming a third
cluster and Ireland and the United Kingdom comprising a fourth. However, when proxies
for the public provision of social services and defamilialization are introduced into the
analysis, this four-group structure completely disappears, as seen in the first columns of
Tables 10 and 14. This lack of perceptible clusters persists until at least 1965, and it is
only weakly evident that Australia and New Zealand are again members of a separate
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cluster in 1970.
By 1975, there are signs of three worlds emerging, but it is not until 1980 that
the countries are properly classified by conventional standards. For the 1975 interval,
measure set A once again contains only two clusters, with Australia and New Zealand
categorized as a discrete cluster. When the analysis is extended to the measure set B,
however, the Nordic countries, Canada, and the United Kingdom break off to form a
third cluster (see Table 15). The inclusion of the second measure of defamilialization,
the parental leave replacement rate, causes this third cluster to split into two, with
Canada and the United Kingdom joined by Ireland and the United States in one group
and the Nordic countries minus Norway in the other. Moving forward to 1980, three
clusters are secerned in measure set A, with the Anglo-Saxon countries divided among
two clusters and the remaining 12 countries and the United States assigned to the third
cluster. Looking at the results for measure sets B and C, the addition of the measures for
the public provision of social services and defamilialization again helps differentiate the
Nordic countries, leading to a fourth cluster. Finally, as Table 12 shows, the inclusion
of measures for post-tax/transfer poverty and activation produces clustering that corre-
sponds exactly with the conventional three-world typology: Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland belonging to the conservative
regime; Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States com-
prising the liberal regime; and Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden making up the
social democratic regime.(e.g., see Esping-Andersen and Hicks 2005).
Beyond 1980, the three clusters remain quite stable, with there only being a few
instances in which a country switches from one cluster to another. The results for
measure set D, for instance, have Belgium classified as a member of the social democratic
regime in 1985, but it then returns to the conservative regime by 1990. Moreover, Finland
appears to move from the social democratic cluster to the conservative cluster by 1990
or 1995. Measure sets A, B, and C also appear less capable of differentiating between the
conservative and liberal regimes, as many of these countries are shown as being grouped
together by 1995. When analyzing all of the welfare state dimensions, however, only
Canada moves from the liberal regime to the conservative regime and only for the 1995
results.
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Looking beyond the cluster numbers and country categorizations, the geometry and
certainty reported for each iteration of the analysis are quite consistent across measure
sets and intervals. According the model-selection output, the optimal parameterization
of the covariance matrix for nearly every model is one based on a spherical distribu-
tion. The clusters generated by this parameterization feature variable volumes but equal
shapes. At the same time, the results indicate a high degree of certainty in the classifi-
cation of countries, with uncertainty levels for all classifications below the conventional
threshold of 0.05 and most below 0.001.
Turning to the results from agglomerative hierarchical cluster analyses, the dendro-
grams generally confirm the findings from the model-based approach. In the 1950s, the
dendrograms show Australia and New Zealand to be distinctly separated from the re-
maining 16 countries. For 1975, the dendrogram for measure set B depicts a tree that
exactly corroborates the three clusters found by the accompanying model-based analysis
with the one exception of Ireland. There are also direct correspondences between all of
the dendrograms and model-based results for all of the measure sets for 1980 and 1985.
For the intervals that the model-based approach did not find any distinct clusters,
the corresponding dendrograms reveal some tentative clusters. In 1960, the dendrogram
for measure set B suggests that Anglo-Saxon countries, Nordic countries, and France
formed one large group and the remaining continental European countries and Japan
formed another. However, the AU p-values for these two large clusters—78% and 69%—
are relatively low, so the clusters should be seen as indeterminate. For 1965, these two
clusters are again identified and with higher certainty, 87% and 88%, respectively. By
1970, however, the dendrograms for measure sets B and C intimate that the Nordic
countries had become grouped with the continental European countries and Japan,
leaving the Anglo-Saxon countries clustered together. The p-values for the clusters
in the first of these dendrograms are weak, but the ones reported for the second are
stronger: 86% and 82%.
Discussion and Conclusions
The results for this study indicate that the three worlds of welfare first began emerg-
ing in 1975, became more marked in 1980, and were relatively firm by 1985. These
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findings suggest that Esping-Andersen made a fortunate decision in selecting 1980 as
the year for his cross-sectional analysis that engendered the three-world typology. Look-
ing more closely at the results, however, this study casts further doubt on the validity
of Esping-Andersen’s original approach to identifying real-world welfare-state clusters.
Analysis of measure set A, which closely approximates the data used by Esping-Andersen
in his analysis, did discern three clusters in 1980, but the memberships of these clusters
in no way resemble those of Esping-Andersen’s groupings. In essence, the results from
this analysis add further weight to Esping-Andersen’s key findings, but they again bring
into question the approach he used to generate these findings.
In addition, this study confirms that the public provision of social services and defa-
milialization are essential in differentiating between the three worlds of welfare. Looking
at 1975, for instance, three worlds are established only after including a measure for each
of these two dimensions, as implied by the analysis of measure set B. This effect is fur-
ther evident in the results reported for each interval from 1980 up through 1995, where
there is shift in distinct clusters from two for measure set A to three for measure set
B. As theorized, the dimensions for the public provision of social services and defamil-
ialization appear to be especially crucial in distinguishing between the conservative and
social democratic welfare state regimes. These results also imply that decommodifica-
tion and stratification alone are insufficient for distinguishing between contemporary
welfare state regimes, a finding that conflicts with the results of prior replication work
on Esping-Andersen’s three-worlds typology using cluster analysis (Edwards 2003).26
There also appears to be some support from this study for the notion that the Aus-
tralia and New Zealand welfare states should be considered distinct from their Anglo-
Saxon cousins. In the 1950s, Australia and New Zealand are assigned to their own
cluster, which squares with Hicks’ claim that these two countries were early welfare con-
solidators (1999). After the 1950s, however, Australia and New Zealand went from being
two of the most advanced welfare states in the world to being two major welfare-state
laggards. The lack of any distinct clusters during the 1960s supports this point because
it denotes that the other welfare states caught up with Australia and New Zealand,
erasing the relative leads of these two countries. By 1975, Australia and New Zealand
26 Unlike Edwards (2003), I do not use the decommodification and stratification scores computed by
Esping-Andersen in my analysis, which may explain why we have arrived at different conclusions
24
do again emerge as a relatively distinct group, but at this point they are distinguished
by their poor and restricted systems of entitlements, not high levels of welfare state gen-
erosity. Moving on to the 1980s, however, Australia and New Zealand are less distinctive
from the other Anglo-Saxon countries, presumably because retrenchment helped spur
convergence towards a more uniform liberal model in these countries. Overall, their
appears to be some justification for considering Australia and New Zealand as members
of a separate “Antipodean” or “wage earner” welfare state regime, particularly for years
prior to 1980.
The emergence of three worlds in the 1975 to 1985 period is consistent with the the-
ory that welfare state development in the postwar era was largely a function of long-term
partisan composition of government. According to this theory, the relative strength of
different political forces over time determined the trajectories of welfare states in ad-
vanced capitalist countries after World War II (Huber and Stephens 2001). Where social
democratic and Christian democratic political forces were dominant, welfare states be-
came more generous and comprehensive over time, though with some notable divergences
in their social-policy designs. In contrast, the continued ascendency of secular center
and right-wing political forces in other countries propagated more minimal or residual
welfare states over time. When examining the results from this study, the composition
of the three worlds discerned in 1980 for measure set D reflect well-known trends in par-
tisan political incumbency. The Nordic countries, which all had strong social democratic
parties in the decades after World War II, are exclusively grouped together while the
continental European countries, which were dominated by Christian democratic forces in
this postwar period, are also clustered together. Moreover, the Anglo-Saxon countries,
which had strong centrist or right-wing tendencies in the decades after World War II,
are members of a single cluster. As alluded to before, Australia and New Zealand may
represent more extreme cases of how the prolonged control of government by right-wing
political forces can impel welfare states to become more residual in nature.
Besides providing confirmatory evidence for the theory that long-term political in-
cumbency fundamentally determined what type of welfare state a given country had in
1980, the results from this study also offer some insight into how this political-based
development process unfolded. As implicitly assumed by this theory, welfare states in
advanced capitalist countries were relatively homogenous at the beginning of the post-
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war period. The cluster analyses for the 1950s indicate that most welfare states were
indistinguishable from one another, with the exception of the Antipodean countries.
Even during the Golden Age of the 1960s and 1970s, welfare states remained relatively
similar to one another, probably because nearly all welfare states were undergoing ex-
pansion at this time. The dendrograms for this period, however, suggest that subtle
shifts were occurring beneath the surface, with the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries
bifurcating into separate groups and the latter of these two groups merging together with
the group of continental European countries and Japan. By the mid-1970s, however, the
Nordic countries split off into their own distinct cluster, which is just about the point
when women’s mobilization started to drive a new expansion of public services in these
countries. Therefore, while welfare expansion was leveling off in the Anglo-Saxon and
continental European states in the early to mid-1970s, it was accelerating in the Nordic
countries, helping to establish a distinct social democratic welfare model.
Once the three worlds emerged around 1980, there is evidence that they remained
relatively stable, a finding that is congruous with the notion of path dependence. As
mentioned before, the concept of path dependence holds that institutions become self-
reinforcing over time because the costs of reversals or switching to alternatives increase
over time (Pierson 2000). As the results from this study show, countries generally became
locked into the three worlds once these worlds became pronounced. For instance, once
the social democratic regime surfaced between 1975 and 1980, the Nordic countries were
consistently tied to this regime type. Of course, Belgium, Canada, and Finland do switch
regimes at some points during the 1980–1995 period, so a strict form of path dependence
is not justified in explaining the persistence of the three worlds.
With respect to the emergence of the three worlds, there is no evidence to suggest
that countries developed firm institutional trajectories in the early postwar period that
predetermined later welfare state development. As alluded to before, the Nordic and
Anglo-Saxon countries seem to have been on a similar trajectory up through the early
1970s, at which point they diverged. The Nordic countries then went on form highly
decommodifying and socially ameliorating welfare states while Anglo-Saxon countries
reengineered their welfare states to be become more residual. So, while the cluster pat-
terns reported in this study are consistent with a weaker path-dependence explanation
for the stability of the three worlds, they do not support a strong “critical juncture”
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interpretation of welfare state development.
Although this study has established that Esping-Andersen’s three-worlds typology
is empirically valid from around 1980 up through 1995, no definite inferences can be
made about the period after 1995. The re-categorization of Canada and Finland as con-
servative welfare state regimes in 1995 could be interpreted as evidence of convergence
between the three worlds, but these moves are likely temporary aberrations. Finland’s
switch, for example, is almost certainly due to retrenching reforms carried out in re-
sponse to a severe economic depression that occurred there from 1990–1993. Since 1995,
the Finnish welfare state has, for the most part, rebounded from this retrenchment.
It is, however, reasonable to question the continued durability of the three-world ty-
pology; contemporary welfare states face a number of new challenges, including aging
populations and a knowledge-based economy (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). Advanced
capitalist countries may be on the brink of a new epoch of path-breaking welfare reform
that could dramatically reshape the welfare state landscape.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Rank-Order of Welfare States in
Terms of Combined Decommodification, 1980
Country Decommodificaton Score
Australia 13.0
United States 13.8
New Zealand 17.1
Canada 22.0
Ireland 23.3
United Kingdom 23.4
Italy 24.1
Japan 27.1
France 27.5
Germany 27.7
Finland 29.2
Switzerland 29.8
Austria 31.1
Belgium 32.4
Netherlands 32.4
Denmark 38.1
Norway 38.3
Sweden 39.1
Mean 27.2
S.D. 7.7
Source: Esping-Andersen 1990, 52, Table 2.2.
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Table 2: Clustering of Welfare States According to Liberal, Conservative, and Socialist
Regime Attributes, 1980
Liberalism Conservatism Socialism
Strong Australia (10) Austria (8) Denmark (8)
Canada (12) Belgium (8) Finland (6)
Japan (10) France (8) Netherlands (6)
Switzerland (12) Germany (8) Norway (8)
United States (12) Italy (8) Sweden (8)
Medium Denmark (6) Finland (6) Australia (4)
France (8) Ireland (4) Belgium (4)
Germany (6) Japan (4) Canada (4)
Italy (6) Netherlands (4) Germany (4)
Netherlands (8) Norway (4) New Zealand (4)
United Kingdom (6) Switzerland (4)
United Kingdom (4)
Low Austria (4) Australia (0) Austria (2)
Belgium (4) Canada (2) France (2)
Finland (4) Denmark (2) Ireland (2)
Ireland (2) New Zealand (2) Italy (0)
New Zealand (2) Sweden (0) Japan (2)
Norway (0) Switzerland (0) United States (0)
Sweden (0) United Kingdom (0)
United States (0)
Source: Esping-Andersen 1990, 74, Table 3.3.
Table 3: Core Dimensions of the Three Welfare State Regimes
Dimension Liberal Conservative Social Democratic
Decommodification low medium high
Public provision of
social services
low low high
Population coverage selective occupational universal
Income redistribution low low high
Post-tax/transfer
poverty
low medium high
Defamilialization low low high
Activation medium low high
Note: This table is similar to one developed by Esping-Andersen and Hicks
(2005, 513).
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Table 4: Welfare State Clusters for 1952 and 1980
1952a 1980b
Consolidators Social Democratic
Austria Austria
Australia Belgium
Belgium Denmark
Denmark Netherlands
Netherlands Norway
New Zealand Sweden
Norway
Sweden Conservative
United Kingdom Finland
France
Non-Consolidators Germany
Canada Italy
Finland Japan
France Switzerland
Germany
Italy Liberal
Japan Australia
Switzerland Canada
United States Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
a Ireland is excluded from Hicks’ pre-Wold War II analysis for
“excessively mimicking British social policy” (1999, 31). At
one point, however, Hicks does imply that Ireland was in fact
a consolidator in 1952 (1999, 111).
b Based on Esping-Andersen’s decommodification clusters.
Sources: Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks 1999
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Table 5: Measure Descriptions and Sources
Measure Description Source
Decommodification
Old-Age Pensions
Minimum net RR Net minimum annual replacement rate
for old-age pensions for a single worker.
SCIP (2007)
APW net RR Net annual replacement rate for old-age
pensions for a single APW.
SCIP (2007)
Contribution period Number of years of contribution
required to qualify for benefit, made in
course of the reference period.
SCIP (2007)
Financed by Insured Total proportion of insurance fund
receipts derived from contributions by
the individuals insured.
SCIP (2007)
Sick Pay
APW net RR Net replacement rate for a single APW
for a 26-week sickness spell, with the
prior half-years wage income excluded.
SCIP (2007)
Waiting Days Number of legislated administrative
waiting days at the beginning of a
sickness spell, during which no benefits
are paid out.
SCIP (2007)
Duration Number of weeks for which the sickness
benefit is payable to a single industrial
worker with a work record.
SCIP (2007)
Contribution period Number of weeks of contribution
required to qualify for benefit, made in
course of the reference period.
SCIP (2007)
Unemployment
Insurance
APW net RR Net replacement rate for a single APW
for a 26-week unemployment spell, with
the prior half-years wage income
excluded.
SCIP (2007)
Waiting Days Number of legislated administrative
waiting days at the beginning of a
unemployment spell, during which no
benefits are paid out.
SCIP (2007)
Duration Number of weeks for which the
unemployment benefit is payable to a
single industrial worker with a work
record.
SCIP (2007)
Contribution period Number of weeks of contribution
required to qualify for benefit, made in
course of the reference period.
SCIP (2007)
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Table 5: Measure Descriptions and Sources (continued)
Measure Description Source
Public Provision of Social
Services
Government
Employment
Civilian government employment as a
percentage of the working-age
population.
CWS (2004)
Population Coverage
Pension Take-Up
Rate
Share of the population above the
normal pension age that is receiving a
pension.
SCIP (2007)
Pension Coverage
Rate
Percentage of the population aged 15–65
that will be eligible for pensions at the
normal age of retirement.
SCIP (2007)
Sickness Coverage
Rate
Percentage of labor force that is covered
by sickness insurance.
SCIP (2007)
Unemployment
Coverage Rate
Percentage of labor force that is covered
by unemployment insurance.
SCIP (2007)
Public Share of
Health Spending
Public share of total spending on health
care as a percentage of GDP.
CWS (2004)
Income Redistribution
Pension Benefit
Equality
Net annual replacement rate for old-age
pensions for a single APW as a
percentage of the stipulated maximum
net replacement rate.
SCIP (2007)
Sickness Benefit
Equality
Net annual replacement rate for sick pay
for a single APW as a percentage of the
stipulated maximum net replacement
rate.
SCIP (2007)
Unemployment
Benefit Equality
Net annual replacement rate for
unemployment insurance for a single
APW as a percentage of the stipulated
maximum net replacement rate.
SCIP (2007)
Gini Index – Gross Estimated Gini index of gross disposable
household income.
SCIP (2007)
Gini Index – Net Estimated Gini index of net disposable
household income.
SCIP (2007)
Post-Tax/Transfer
Poverty
Relative Poverty –
Total
Percentage of households with
disposable incomes below 50% of the
average disposable household income.
LIS (2009)
Sources: Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) (2007); Comparative Welfare States (CWS)
Data Set (2004); Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures; OECD Social Expenditures Database
(SOCX) (2007);
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Table 5: Measure Descriptions and Sources (continued)
Measure Description Source
Post-Tax/Transfer
Poverty (cont.)
Relative Poverty –
Children
Percentage of children in households
with disposable incomes below 50% of
the average disposable household
income.
LIS (2009)
Relative Poverty –
Elderly
Percentage of elderly households with
disposable incomes below 50% of the
average disposable household income.
LIS (2009)
Defamilialization
Female Labor Force
Participation
Percentage of women aged 15–64 who
are in the labor force.
CWS (2004)
Parental Leave RR Average replacement rate for parental
leave for a 52-week period.
Gauthier and
Bortnik (2001)
Activation
Active Labor Market
Policies
Total public spending on active labor
market policies as a percentage of GDP
divided by the unemployment rate.
SOCX (2008)
Table 6: Sets of Measures
Set
Dimension A B C D
Decommodification 12 12 12 12
Public provision of
social services
1 1 1
Population coverage 4a 5 5 5
Income redistribution 3b 5 5 5
Post-tax/transfer
poverty
3
Defamilialization 1c 2 2
Activation 1
Total Variables 19 24 25 29
a 3 coverage rates and take-up rate.
b 3 benefit-equality measures.
c Female labor force participation.
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Table 7: Possible Parameterizations of the Covariance matrix Σk and Their
Geometric Features
Identifier Model Distribution Volume Shape Orientation
EII λI spherical equal equal NA
VII λkI spherical variable equal NA
EEI λA diagonal equal equal along the axes
VEI λkA diagonal variable equal along the axes
EVI λAk diagonal equal variable along the axes
VVI λkAk diagonal variable variable along the axes
EEE λDADT ellipsoidal equal equal equal
EEV λDkADTk ellipsoidal equal equal variable
VEV λkDkADTk ellipsoidal variable equal variable
VVV λkDkAkDTk ellipsoidal variable variable variable
Source: Fraley and Raftery 2007b, 6, Table 1
Table 8: Number of Distinct Clusters
Detected For Each Set of Measures
Set of Measures
Year A B C D
1950 2
1955 2
1960 4 1
1965 1 1
1970 2 1 1
1975 2 3 4
1980 3 4 4 3
1985 2 3 3 3
1990 2 3 3 3
1995 2 3 3 3
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Table 9: Country Classifications for Measure Set A for Each Five-Year Interval from 1950–
1995
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Canada 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 2
Denmark 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2= 2 2
Finland 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
France 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ireland 2 2 4 1 2 2 3 1 2 1
Italy 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2ﬁ 2 2
Japan 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2= 2 2
Netherlands 2 2 3ﬁ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Sweden 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Switzerland 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
United Kingdom 2 2 4 1 2 2 3 1 2 2
United States 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
Distinct Clusters 2 2 4 1 2 2 3 2 2 2
Variance Model VII VII VII VII VII VII VII VII VII EII
BIC -1010 -1006 -1009 -1010 -997 -976 -992 -995 -982 -982
Note: The uncertainties for all of the classifications listed above is less than 0.001 unless otherwise
indicated: = < 0.01 and ﬁ < 0.05.
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Table 10: Country Classifications for Measure Set B for Each Five-Year Interval
from 1960–1995
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Canada 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 2
Denmark 1 1 1 3 4 3 3 3
Finland 1 1 1 3 4 3= 2 2
France 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Ireland 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2
Italy 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Japan 1 1 1 2 2 2 2= 2
Netherlands 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 1 1 1 3 4 3 3 3
Sweden 1 1 1 3 4 3 3 3
Switzerland 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
United Kingdom 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 2
United States 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
Distinct Clusters 1 1 1 3 4 3 3 3
Variance Model VII VII VII VII VII VII VII VII
BIC -1275 -1275 -1275 -1248 -1252 -1266 -1250 -1248
Note: The uncertainties for all of the classifications listed above is less than 0.001 unless
otherwise indicated: = < 0.01 and ﬁ < 0.05.
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Table 11: Country Classifications for Measure Set C for Each
Five-Year Interval from 1970–1995
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 1 2 2 2 2 2
Canada 1 3 3 1 2 2
Denmark 1 4 4 3 3 3
Finland 1 4 4 3 3 2
France 1 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 1 2 2 2 2 2
Ireland 1 3 3 1 2 2
Italy 1 2 2 2 2 2
Japan 1 2 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 1 2 2 2 2 2
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 1 2= 4 3 3 3
Sweden 1 4 4 3 3 3
Switzerland 1 2 2 2 2 2
United Kingdom 1 3 3 1 2 2
United States 1 3 2 1 2 2
Distinct Clusters 1 4 4 3 3 3
Variance Model VII VII VII VII VII VII
BIC -1328 -1322 -1299 -1308 -1298 -1292
Note: The uncertainties for all of the classifications listed above is less
than 0.001 unless otherwise indicated: = < 0.01 and ﬁ < 0.05.
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Table 12: Country Classifications for Measure Set
D for Each Five-Year Interval from 1980–1995
1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia 1 1 1 1
Austria 2 2 2 2
Belgium 2 3 2 2
Canada 1 1 1 2ﬁ
Denmark 3 3 3 3
Finland 3 3 3 2
France 2 2 2 2
Germany 2 2 2 2
Ireland 1 1 1 1
Italy 2 2 2 2
Japan 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 2 2 2 2
New Zealand 1 1 1 1
Norway 3 3 3 3
Sweden 3 3 3 3
Switzerland 2 2 2 2
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1
United States 1 1 1 1
Distinct Clusters 3 3 3 3
Variance Model VII VII VII VII
BIC -1522 -1523 -1502 -1488
Note: The uncertainties for all of the classifications
listed above is less than 0.001 unless otherwise
indicated: = < 0.01 and ﬁ < 0.05.
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Table 13: Country Clusters for Measure Set A for Each Five-Year Interval from 1950–
1995
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Austria Austria Austria Australia Austria
Belgium Belgium Belgium Austria Belgium
Canada Canada France Belgium Canada
Denmark Denmark Germany Canada Denmark
Finland Finland Italy Denmark Finland
France France Japan Finland France
Germany Germany France Germany
Ireland Ireland Canada Germany Ireland
Italy Italy Denmark Ireland Italy
Japan Japan Finland Italy Japan
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Japan Netherlands
Norway Norway Norway Netherlands Norway
Sweden Sweden Sweden New Zealand Sweden
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Norway Switzerland
United Kingdom United Kingdom United States Sweden United Kingdom
United States United States Switzerland United States
Ireland United Kingdom
Australia Australia United Kingdom United States Australia
New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand
Australia
New Zealand
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium
Canada Denmark Denmark Canada Canada
Denmark Finland Finland Denmark Denmark
Finland France France Finland Finland
France Germany Germany France France
Germany Italy Italy Germany Germany
Ireland Japan Japan Ireland Italy
Italy Netherlands Netherlands Italy Japan
Japan Norway Norway Japan Netherlands
Netherlands Sweden Sweden Netherlands Norway
Norway Switzerland Switzerland Norway Sweden
Sweden United States Sweden Switzerland
Switzerland Australia Switzerland United Kingdom
United Kingdom Canada Canada United Kingdom United States
United States Ireland Ireland United States
United Kingdom New Zealand Australia
Australia United Kingdom Australia Ireland
New Zealand Australia United States New Zealand New Zealand
New Zealand
xviii
Table 14: Country Clusters for Measure Set B for Each Five-Year
Interval from 1960–1995
1960 1965 1970 1975
Australia Australia Australia Austria
Austria Austria Austria Belgium
Belgium Belgium Belgium France
Canada Canada Canada Germany
Denmark Denmark Denmark Ireland
Finland Finland Finland Italy
France France France Japan
Germany Germany Germany Netherlands
Ireland Ireland Ireland Switzerland
Italy Italy Italy United States
Japan Japan Japan
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Australia
New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand
Norway Norway Norway
Sweden Sweden Sweden Canada
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Denmark
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom Finland
United States United States United States Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom
1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria Austria Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium
France France Finland Canada
Germany Germany France Finland
Italy Italy Germany France
Japan Japan Italy Germany
Netherlands Netherlands Japan Ireland
Switzerland Switzerland Netherlands Italy
United States Switzerland Japan
Australia Netherlands
Canada Canada Australia Switzerland
Ireland Ireland Canada United Kingdom
United Kingdom New Zealand Ireland United States
United Kingdom New Zealand
Australia United States United Kingdom Australia
New Zealand United States New Zealand
Denmark
Denmark Finland Denmark Denmark
Finland Norway Norway Norway
Norway Sweden Sweden Sweden
Sweden
xix
Table 15: Country Clusters for Measure Set C for Each Five-Year
Interval from 1970–1995
1970 1975 1980 1985
Australia Austria Austria Austria
Austria Belgium Belgium Belgium
Belgium France France France
Canada Germany Germany Germany
Denmark Italy Italy Italy
Finland Japan Japan Japan
France Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Germany Norway Switzerland Switzerland
Ireland Switzerland United States
Italy Australia
Japan Canada Canada Canada
Netherlands Ireland Ireland Ireland
New Zealand United Kingdom United Kingdom New Zealand
Norway United States United Kingdom
Sweden Australia United States
Switzerland Australia New Zealand
United Kingdom New Zealand Denmark
United States Denmark Finland
Denmark Finland Norway
Finland Norway Sweden
Sweden Sweden
1990 1995
Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium
Canada Canada
France Finland
Germany France
Ireland Germany
Italy Ireland
Japan Italy
Netherlands Japan
Switzerland Netherlands
United Kingdom Switzerland
United States United Kingdom
United States
Australia
New Zealand Australia
New Zealand
Denmark
Finland Denmark
Norway Norway
Sweden Sweden
xx
Table 16: Country Clusters for Measure Set D for Each Five-Year
Interval from 1980–1995
1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia Australia Australia Australia
Canada Canada Canada Ireland
Ireland Ireland Ireland New Zealand
New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand United Kingdom
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United States
United States United States United States
Austria
Austria Austria Austria Belgium
Belgium France Belgium Canada
France Germany France Finland
Germany Italy Germany France
Italy Japan Italy Germany
Japan Netherlands Japan Italy
Netherlands Switzerland Netherlands Japan
Switzerland Switzerland Netherlands
Belgium Switzerland
Denmark Denmark Denmark
Finland Finland Finland Denmark
Norway Norway Norway Norway
Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden
xxi
Fig. 1: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set A – 1950 and 1955
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Note: The approximately unbiased (AU) p-value and bootstrap probability (BP) value (percentages)
represent the probability that a cluster is supported by the data.
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Fig. 2: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set A – 1960 and 1965
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Fig. 3: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set A – 1970 and 1975
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Fig. 4: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set A – 1980 and 1985
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Fig. 5: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set A – 1990 and 1995
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Fig. 6: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set B – 1960 and 1965
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Fig. 7: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set B – 1970 and 1975
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Fig. 8: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set B – 1980 and 1985
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Fig. 9: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set B – 1990 and 1995
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represent the probability that a cluster is supported by the data.
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Fig. 10: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set C – 1970 and 1975
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Note: the approximately unbiased (AU) p-value and bootstrap probability (BP) value represent the
probability that a cluster is supported by the data.
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Fig. 11: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set C – 1980 and 1985
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Note: The approximately unbiased (AU) p-value and bootstrap probability (BP) value (percentages)
represent the probability that a cluster is supported by the data.
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Fig. 12: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set C – 1990 and 1995
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Note: The approximately unbiased (AU) p-value and bootstrap probability (BP) value (percentages)
represent the probability that a cluster is supported by the data.
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Fig. 13: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set D – 1980 and 1985
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represent the probability that a cluster is supported by the data.
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Fig. 14: Dendrograms with P-Values for Measure Set D – 1990 and 1995
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